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Segmented Publics and the Regulation of Critical Speech in China 
 
SOPHIA WOODMAN 
University of Edinburgh 
 
Abstract: In contemporary China strict censorship coexists with significant freedom of 
expression and restrictions are enforced inconsistently. Yet certain principles underlie 
determinations of what is acceptable public speech, depending on the institutional location of 
the utterance, the identity of the speaker and the time of the event. What is allowed depends 
on the specific circumstances, but it results from patterns in the institutional practices of 
Chinese politics that involve constraining debate within “segmented publics”. This article 
analyses how formal and informal rules limit discussions of particular issues to specific 
segmented publics, and how varying degrees of debate are permitted within these 
institutional fields, based on the expertise of their members or, in the case of associations, 
their engagement in specific areas of policy implementation. Another dimension of variation 
relates to the personalised character of authority in the Chinese system of governance, which 
means that leaders set the tone for debate within institutional spheres they control. State 
control, however, is only part of the story: segmented publics are dynamic spaces where 
boundaries are permeable, often contested, and constantly in formation. The operation of 
segmented publics is explored here through case studies of activism in the legal field; on 
women’s rights in the associational field; at the grassroots in resident and villager 
committees; and in oppositional publics. 
 
Keywords: China, segmented publics, censorship, freedom of expression, politics, law, 
grassroots organisations 
 
Introduction 
Overall, freedom of expression has expanded significantly in reform-era China, yet standards 
for acceptable speech vary enormously. Strict mechanisms of censorship coexist with a 
significant degree of freedom of expression, for both speech and writing. Discerning the 
boundaries of official tolerance for critical public speech is difficult and enforcement of 
censorship appears to be extremely inconsistent. Speech that may land one person in jail is 
acceptable when said or written by someone else in another context. A notable example is 
evident from a comparison of the text of the manifesto Charter ’08 with official statements on 
political reform, human rights and constitutionalism (Potter, 2011; Potter and Woodman, 
2012). Despite many shared features between these official texts and the Charter, the drafting 
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of the latter was a key component of the “crimes” of Liu Xiaobo, for which he is now serving 
an 11-year prison term.  
 
Here I argue that certain principles underlie determinations by the authorities of what is 
acceptable public speech, depending on the institutional location of the utterance; the identity, 
status and history of the speaker; and the time of the event. The combination of all these 
factors means that determining what may be restricted or allowed depends on the specific 
context, but results from a number of regularities that relate to institutional practices of 
Chinese politics. I deploy the concept of “segmented publics” as a theoretical device to 
elucidate these patterns. This concept has generally been used to indicate separations along 
discursive and spatial lines, while by contrast I adopt a more institutional focus that 
highlights boundaries and the making of them. Here, segmented publics are conceptualised as 
dynamic spaces where boundaries are permeable, often contested, and constantly in 
formation. Such contestation involves the application of formal and informal rules that limit 
discussion of particular issues to specific institutional fields. When disputes arise over the 
boundaries of appropriate expression, the issues involved may become politicised, and the 
right of a person or group to raise a complaint or speak on a certain issue may be challenged 
(Zhu and Ho, 2008; Zhu, 2007). 
 
Varying degrees of debate are permitted within certain segmented publics based on the 
expertise of their members or, in the case of associations, their engagement in specific areas 
of policy implementation. Another dimension of variation relates to the personalised 
character of authority in the Chinese system of governance, which means that leaders can set 
the tone for debate within the institutional spheres they control.  
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This article begins by briefly examining the historical development of the concept of 
“publics” and “public-ness” in China, then considers the segmentation of publics in China 
and beyond. It proceeds to explore the operation of segmented publics through examples 
from four main areas indicative of a range of degrees of association with formal institutions, 
as well as comprising both elite and non-elite forums, and those such as associations that link 
the latter two: discussions among academics, with legal scholars and lawyers as an example; 
debates in associations, especially those related to women’s rights; the climate for political 
discussion in grassroots organisations; and open dissent in oppositional publics. While the 
discussion of grassroots publics is based on my ethnographic fieldwork, material on the other 
types of publics draws primarily on the work of other scholars. The examples are intended as 
illustrative, rather than exhaustive, since the principal aim of the article is to propose a 
conceptual framework for analysing the systematic features underlying the apparent 
heterogeneity of restrictions on critical speech. 
 
Spaces for Publics 
The emergence of publics engaged in discussion of matters of common concern, including 
how the state should be run, is seen as a key marker of modernity. For some historians of late 
imperial and Republican China, processes analogous to those in Habermas’ account of the 
emergence of a “public sphere” in Europe (Calhoun, 1992; Habermas, 1989) – urbanisation, 
the spread of literacy, increased circulation of printed materials, among others – also 
contributed to the formation of publics in modern China. As in Europe, these spaces existed 
in a complex and intertwined relationship with an expanding state (Rowe, 1990). The 
Chinese character denoting “public” (公) appeared in crucial modern compounds, such as 
“citizen” (公民 gongmin; literally, public person) (Goldman and Perry, 2002). Some scholars, 
however, question the commensurability between the English and Chinese terms, arguing that 
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in the Chinese character公 (gong, public) the state remains more dominant, and where 
sprouts of a public sphere emerged in China’s modern history they have been quickly crushed 
(Wang, Lee and Fischer, 1994).  
 
In late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century projects of political change, the idea of 
popular sovereignty took root in China, making the establishment of a state that ruled in the 
name of the people a public endeavour. A central aspect of these projects was turning all 
kinds of social concerns into public matters, and expanding debate about the fate of the nation 
beyond an elite audience (Yeh, 2004).  
 
As a space for the deliberation of the people on public affairs, the public sphere is not 
confined to the arena of formal politics, yet denotes a sphere beyond the scope of quotidian 
political talk. As Fraser puts it, the public sphere is “a theater in modern societies in which 
political participation is enacted through the medium of talk. It is the space in which citizens 
deliberate about their common affairs, hence an institutionalised arena of discursive 
interaction” (1997, p. 70). This deliberative space incorporates both speakers and an audience, 
as a public is “a space of discourse” delimited by those it addresses (Warner, 2002, p. 50). 
These distinctions point not only to different roles, but also to inequalities in who is heard 
and who listens, as well as questions of access. 
 
Studies focusing on the formation of publics in China have concentrated primarily on elites in 
general, and intellectuals in particular (Kirby, 2004; Gu, 1998; Gu, 1993–94). Lu Xun 
expressed concern about the exclusion of the “silent” majority from “public” debates in the 
burgeoning media and public life of the Republican era (Yeh, 2004). Yet even in the era of 
“the workers’ state”, “… workers and peasants, despite being numerically China’s two largest 
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population groups, have been much neglected in the conception of ‘the Chinese public’” 
(Xing, 2011, p. 818). In the post-Mao era, some Chinese intellectuals who have advocated the 
formation of a “public sphere” inspired by their reading of Habermas conceptualise this as a 
realm of rational deliberation, thus according more weight to the contributions of educated 
elites (Davies, 2007). Even though environmental activists actively seek to form a “green 
public sphere” in China (Sima, 2011; Yang and Calhoun, 2007), they also constrain the scope 
of their debates through “gating” practices such as limiting access to online bulletin boards 
(Sima, 2011, pp. 492–93). 
 
Such inequalities and exclusions have been inherent in public spheres beyond China. The 
actually existing public sphere Habermas wrote about was in fact divided into competing elite 
sub-spheres, while “plebeian” spaces and “subaltern counterpublics” existed on its 
boundaries (Calhoun, 1992). Critiques of Habermas’ original “public sphere” conception 
pointed to implicit exclusions and inequality in its operations, based not on state rules or 
institutional arrangements, but on status inequalities in civil society (see for example, Fraser, 
1997; Calhoun, 1992; Yang and Calhoun, 2007).  
 
Yang and Calhoun refer to three dimensions of public spheres: the discourses that circulate 
within them, the publics that engage in these discourses, and the media of communication 
involved. Distinctions may also be made between the form and the content of the discussion 
that occurs within them (2007). Here I focus primarily on the form of public spheres and the 
specific publics involved, seeking to theorise institutional regularities in the boundedness of 
public spheres in contemporary China through the concept of “segmented publics”. 
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This concept has previously been used in two main senses, denoting respectively discursive 
and spatial separation of public spheres. In the first of these areas, scholars of 
communications have debated the effects of the Internet age, with its shift from mass media 
to segmented audiences, on the formation of public opinion and consumer preferences. Here 
the idea of “segmented publics” has been used to highlight separations among groups along 
ideological, class or lifestyle lines, in contrast to the optimistic assumption that the internet 
would act as an open space for democratic deliberation and public debate (see, for example, 
Mosco, 2009; Yúdice, 1992). Segmentation in this sense is conceptualised as resulting from 
narrowly targeting specific audiences with particular messages creating market niches. 
Specialised policy communities may create similarly segmented discursive spaces, as 
highlighted in Eriksen’s study of transnational expert communities devoted to the discussion 
of policy in the European Union. Such issue-specific “segmented publics” are separated from 
each other and from intra-national debates (Eriksen, 2009). Yadav (2010) has used the 
concept to denote publics that inhabit spaces physically separated along gender lines in the 
Muslim world. Yet this spatial segregation does not necessarily segment mediated 
communication, so discursive separation may not be a feature of these segmented publics. 
 
By contrast, I use the term segmented publics both in a broader and more specific sense, 
concentrating on the institutional dimension across the political landscape of contemporary 
China, and going beyond the Internet focus of recent work on censorship (see, for example, 
King, Pan and Roberts, 2013). Segmented social formations are those with relatively strong 
boundaries between social groups and a low level of intergroup network ties. I deploy the 
concept of segmentation to highlight the relative boundedness or permeability of specific 
publics, as well as ways segmentation is contested. Boundedness is affected by factors 
including the extent to which publics involve face-to-face or mediated communication, as 
  7 
well as how open mediated components of a public are to those outside it. Membership of 
particular segmented publics may be based on individuals’ status, such as expertise or local 
hukou belonging, and it may also be associated with institutional forms, such as social 
organisations or universities and think tanks. These institutions may be associated with 
bounded physical spaces, or could involve virtual connections between the publics they 
engage. 
 
As publics are inherently “self-creating and self-organized” by the discourses they engage 
(Warner, 2002, p.51), even in this segmented form they constantly overflow actual 
institutional spaces. Certainly, the Chinese state seeks to create a segmented political system 
by granting monopolies on representation of specific groups, processes well captured through 
the perspective of state corporatism (Hsu and Hasmath, 2013). Yet this top-down vision fails 
to give sufficient weight to the agency of actors engaged in turning certain issues into public 
matters (Yang and Calhoun, 2007). 
 
The operation of segmented publics involves a constant contest between what might be 
termed the “state corporatist project” and the concerns emerging in specific public spheres 
over what is, or can be, public, in contemporary China. The outcome of such contests is 
determined not only by state and Communist Party rules and institutions, but also by social 
norms and hierarchies. The segmented publics concept highlights divisions between arenas 
for discussion, and focuses on the institutional location of the speech. Through formal and 
informal rules that limit discussions of particular issues within specific institutional spaces, 
and restrict the circulation of those discussions within certain specified ambits, the Chinese 
authorities extend the government bureaucracy’s practice of restricting circulation of 
information outward beyond the boundaries of formal political institutions.1 These rules 
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affect both speakers and audiences, since they constrain what can be said where. 
Segmentation is not only a matter of government control; it also reflects a modern privileging 
of expertise and rationality that justifies restricting debate to certain “qualified” persons. 
Exclusions based on status lead not only to restrictions on speakers, but to the exclusion of 
certain audiences from particular places in which matters deemed to be of public concern – 
even when these directly affect their lives – are the subject of deliberation (Woodman, 
2011a). At the same time, however, actors seeking to make their concerns public are 
constantly challenging the limits of segmentation, by turning an institutional space into a 
public sphere in the first place, by extending the scope of what can be said within a 
segmented space, and by breaching the boundaries of such spaces to incorporate new 
audiences and speakers. 
 
Expert publics: Contests over the “Rule of Law” 
 
Within bodies such as universities and think tanks, debates around some contentious issues 
are considered legitimate due to the expert knowledge and status of their members. In these 
spaces, educated elites are authorised to participate “in the ordering of society as specialists 
who advise government and business” (Cheek, 2007, p. 18). The rise of the figure of the 
“expert” serves to insulate intellectuals somewhat from their previous immersion in 
officialdom, creating an expanded scope for critique (Cheek, 2007). Habermas noted the 
tension between the claims of social science to rational and apparently disinterested expertise 
on matters of policy, and the deliberation of publics over such matters (Calhoun, 1992). 
These segmented publics are themselves divided according to categories of knowledge and 
expertise, and may be constituted as representing competing positions in particular fields (Gu, 
1993–94).  
  9 
 
Here, then, issues such as politics and the rule of law, even the regulation of speech itself, can 
become technical matters on which people with relevant training may advance opinions based 
on their study of the subject. Among scholars of the subject, debates on constitutionalism in 
China can incorporate issues of separation of powers or even multi-party systems as an aspect 
of expert evaluation of options for future reform. In academic media and conferences, some 
legal scholars have been fairly frank in their criticism of deficiencies of China’s criminal 
procedure law, as well as in making suggestions for constitutional reform. Distinctions are 
drawn along a gradated spectrum between what can be said in such academic fora, in 
specialist newspapers such as Legal Daily, and in the mainstream media.  
 
Legal academics regularly use emergent events – such as specific cases, disasters or the 
issuance of new official documents and positions – as opportunities to breach the bounds of 
their segmented publics and bring their advocacy of such projects as judicial independence or 
constitutional reform to a wider public. Consider the example of a 2001 Supreme People’s 
Court instruction to a lower court that seemed to open the door to constitutional rights being 
invoked as grounds for legal claims in specific cases. That case evoked a flurry of articles by 
legal scholars in academic journals and mainstream media on subjects including 
“constitutional development, the shortcomings of China’s current legal structure, rights 
protection under the law, and even, in an indirect manner, the slow pace of political reform” 
(Kellogg, 2009, p. 232). This is an example of the “judicialisation of politics” that is apparent 
in authoritarian regimes elsewhere (Fu, 2012). Legal cases also function as a type of “event” 
that opens up debate: courts have also emerged as a space in which critiques of repressive 
state practices can be presented as part of a lawyer’s argument, turning a court into a public 
sphere. For example, activist lawyers have raised taboo issues such as the treatment of 
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practitioners of the banned Falungong spiritual group in Chinese courtrooms, “turn[ing] the 
trial of dissidents into a trial of the system” (Fu, 2012, p. 199).  
 
Legal academics have been able to discuss human rights issues within academic fora such as 
conferences and legal journals, although they are constrained in their capacity to publish 
some sorts of materials on systematic human rights abuses occurring in China. They have, for 
example, discussed law and policy measures needed for the implementation of human rights 
treaties that China has ratified. This type of discussion, however, rarely finds its way into the 
mainstream public media, and diplomats and government officials designate UN processes 
related to China’s implementation of its international human rights obligations as a matter of 
“international cooperation” that is separated from domestic discussion (Woodman, 2005).  
 
While relatively heated debate in these expert legal fields has risen and fallen in intensity in 
recent years, a distinction is made between advocacy confined to expert publics and “action” 
in the broader public sphere (Davies, 2012). Noted Peking University law professor He 
Weifang had been advocating judicial independence and other systemic reforms publicly for 
many years – including in articles in mainstream media – but when he signed Charter ’08 he 
was exiled to a remote university in Shihezi, Xinjiang.2 His support for the Charter’s 
proposals was probably less important in precipitating his internal exile than the association 
of his name with those of key members of the “oppositional public” described below, and 
with their efforts at collective advocacy.  
 
Associational Publics: Creating Space for Advocacy on Women’s Rights 
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A second type of segmented public is in the field of associations that exist on the margins of 
and even inside state agencies. In this context, discussions are authorised among members of 
organisations that assist the government in carrying out policies and mobilising the public for 
shared goals. Here, both expertise and the encouragement of a certain degree of citizen 
participation are justifications for allowing freer discussion of the specific issues designated 
as the concerns of the group in question. The scope such associations are creating for 
advocacy and debate has been expressed in the idea of “embedded activism” (see Ho and 
Edmonds, 2008).  This concept shows how the embeddedness of social organisations – 
manifested in blurred distinctions between civil society and state, in the formation of groups 
within the state structure, and in the interpersonal connections that make these possible – 
serves both to constrain and to enable action on a set of shared goals. As Ho and Edmonds  
(2008, p. 220) write, “...embedded environmentalism is a resourceful and negotiated strategy 
employed by activists to gain maximum political and social influence ... by professing to 
uphold the principles of the [CCP] and the state”. 
 
Yet this conception of embeddedness may be insufficiently dynamic: it neglects the fact that 
the state often seeks to coopt and incorporate emerging institutional spaces by drawing them 
into its ambit, as well as the ways new fields of state policy and the institutions formed to 
pursue them may provide a starting point for activist publics. For example, state 
environmentalism has been crucial to forming these spaces for associations and alternative 
media (Yang, 2010). As a central plank of Communist Party policy, equality between men 
and women likewise creates opportunities for public deliberations on these issues. An 
example is how the state’s efforts to engage in transnational norm-setting on women’s issues 
opened up spaces for activists associated with a new wave of feminist organising both within 
and beyond existing institutional settings. Women’s Federations and the various kinds of 
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non-profits that work with them are authorised to advocate on behalf of women, and 
constitute various segmented publics in which public issues relating to changing gender 
relations are discussed (Milwertz and Bu, 2009).  
 
Activists in these spaces – who sought to bring the idea of domestic violence into public 
consciousness and make it a public matter in China – adopted a number of strategies to 
achieve their goals. One notable element highlighted by Keech-Marx (2008) is how they 
framed their project as being consonant with official policy objectives and slogans. For 
example, they argued that public action against domestic violence would contribute to 
building the “spiritual civilisation” advocated by then President Jiang Zemin. This example 
highlights how endorsement of state-sponsored discourse can sometimes mask a contentious 
claim that seeks to expand the scope of state obligation or challenge existing norms (Liu, 
2009; Wang, 2005). The use of apparently compliant speech as a means to advance feminist 
goals has been a strategy of China’s women’s movement since the early years of the People’s 
Republic (Wang, 2010; Wang, 2005). 
 
This is not to say all feminist contention is concealed behind official rhetoric, or framed in 
uncritical language. The following description of an effort to hold a demonstration in Beijing 
to protest against the treatment of ethnic Chinese women in Indonesia in 1998 highlights the 
character of negotiations around the scope of public debates. A permit for the demonstration 
was refused, so the activists planned to hold a public meeting at the offices of the Women’s 
Federation newspaper China Women’s News. Given that the newspaper is an official organ, 
however, some protest leaders became concerned about being associated with the meeting. In 
the end the event was held in a hotel, and those who did not belong to the Party took the lead, 
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associating their names publicly with the event and labelling it a popular, non-state (民间 
minjian) activity (Milwertz and Bu, 2009). 
 
Grassroots Publics in State Spaces 
 
A third example of segmented publics is those legitimised by the Constitution as institutions 
of self-government, notably the resident committees and villager committees. These 
committees are the location where people can legitimately exercise their constitutional and 
legal right to complain about official actions and policies and to receive an answer, and as 
institutions, have a constitutional mandate to pass on the opinions and demands of their 
constituents, thus institutionalising mass line-type participation.3 They are required to deal 
with all complaints brought to them, no matter what the subject. In the place where a citizen 
belongs, someone must always hear them out, and the various authorities of that place have 
an obligation to provide assistance. In practice, the majority of complaints are reportedly 
made through such institutions (Michelson, 2008).  
 
A manual for workers in the Progress Resident Committee in Tianjin’s Hexi District4 made 
clear that they had to try to resolve every complaint brought to them, and were required to 
listen to people’s grievances. Materials from this committee also articulated specific rights of 
participation for residents in relation to the affairs of the neighbourhood: “the right to know, 
the right to speak, the right to participate and the right to make decisions”. The exercise of 
these rights was aimed at “fully mobilising the activist spirit among residents to participate in 
community activities”.5 The law on villager committees mandates democratic decision-
making and explicitly eschews coercion.6    
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Although the committees are state-sponsored institutions, they are designated as spaces for 
the organisation of “society”. Their formal status as self-governing institutions gives them a 
certain distance from the state. Through engaging in political gossip and talk, groups of 
people could potentially constitute the committees as an alternative public sphere in which 
community norms could be defined, contested and elaborated. Even apparently compliant 
speech could be a means of advancing community norms. People who used these institutional 
locations in this manner thus reclaimed state-oriented space and “reterritorialised” it as a 
place of local deliberation (Feuchtwang, 2004). Given the severe constraints on expression in 
the recent past, the kind of local voice people have in the committees can be significant.7 This 
is not to say people felt there were no constraints: “We don’t have the same kind of freedom 
of expression here [as in your country],” one resident committee worker said to me, after 
someone made a joke about corruption among municipal officials.  
 
My four Tianjin field sites provided distinctly different spaces for political talk. In general, 
the villager committees were not so much a space for social interaction as a corporate HQ, 
but sometimes when ordinary villagers had specific business to conduct with them, political 
talk went on while these transactions were under way. When challengers to the villager 
committee leadership in Zhang Family Village charged the incumbents with electoral fraud, 
township authorities sought to suppress efforts by both sides to discuss in public the issues 
that emerged around this dispute. The incumbents prepared two different open letters 
defending their record to circulate to villagers, but were not allowed to distribute these due to 
the prohibition in Tianjin on “canvassing for votes”. Their opponents lacked the official 
platform of the villager committee, but posted information about the dispute on Internet 
bulletin boards. They also posted copies of a Xinhua commentary on problems in rural 
governance on local notice boards, highlighting a section on the need to combat vote buying.  
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By contrast, the two resident committees were public spaces for informal gatherings, as 
people dropped by to chat and meet each other, but their distinctive political cultures meant 
that these were used in different ways. In the Rising China Resident Committee, where the 
Party Secretary characterised the neighbourhood as well off, and talked about the 
opportunities reform had created for entrepreneurship, there was less overt criticism. At 
Progress Resident Committee, by contrast, a continuing tradition of strong socialist rhetoric 
and a core group of long-term residents meant gripes about the common people being left out 
of the benefits of reform were a frequent theme of conversations. Debates in the public space 
of the committee offices created a distinctive political environment conducive to the 
formation of socialist community norms. An example was the posting on a local noticeboard 
of a letter from a bedridden neighbourhood woman thanking committee workers for assisting 
her when her husband had disappeared leaving her without essential care. This apparently 
compliant act put the lack of emergency home care for people in her position on the public 
agenda, as well as making provision of such care by the committee an informal community 
norm.  
 
The most radical critiques of the existing order came from people in leading positions in the 
two villages I studied. People in Zhang Family Village were keenly aware of the 
discrimination their children faced because they did not live in a proper city district – if they 
wanted to attend top schools, they had to pay enormous fees. At a dinner in Dragon Peak 
Village with visiting academics – including senior Party members from the University – 
Party Secretary Fu complained about the way “models” and priorities imposed from above 
created unrealistic targets and perverse incentives. Overall, the system remained too 
authoritarian to make the best of development opportunities, he asserted.  
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The formal political rights that pertain in grassroots organisations thus create the potential for 
the formation of segmented public spheres within them. Whether or not this potential is 
realised and political talk shifts into another key to form a sphere of debate on issues of 
public concern depends on the local context. Examples of villages in revolt, such as Taishi 
Village in 2005 (Woodman, 2011a) and Wukan Village in 2011, show how such grassroots 
institutions may be a basis for collective action by villagers. By contrast, resident committees 
are administratively closer to the lowest level of government, the street offices. However, 
factors such as the informalisation of state work, the rhetoric around the building of a 
separate “society” and the need to be seen to be responsive to constituents mean that the 
interests of committees and local governments can diverge (Gui, Ma and Mühlhahn, 2009). 
Between such examples and the quiescent committees that are little more than forms of state 
administration, there are many gradations in the extent to which local people use these state-
sponsored institutions as spaces for turning their private concerns into public matters. 
 
Resisting Segmentation: Oppositional Publics 
 
Oppositional critics challenge the boundaries of segmentation, seeking to bring restricted 
debates and matters of concern into wider circulation. For those who frame themselves as 
“loyal critics”, the objective is to expose and correct official wrongdoing using existing 
channels for the expression of grievances. Those who have embraced the “dissident” label are 
explicitly dedicated to the formation of an open national public, breaking down the barriers of 
segmentation and seeing these as unacceptable forms of cooptation.  
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Many oppositional critics have initially tried to make their concerns public using accepted 
channels, such as official media, law suits or the “letters and visits” system that receives 
administrative appeals. Despite their efforts to stay within the bounds of acceptability, it is 
often local officials who politicise their complaints, applying labels to their actions that 
justify repressive measures. The celebrated case of the blind legal activist Chen Guangcheng 
is a case in point: he evidently did not see himself as a “dissident” but sought to enlist higher-
level officials and institutions in disciplining local officials. The response was brutal. 
 
Even the claims of Charter ’08 were framed in terms derived from official discourse, 
presenting a moderate program and arguing for implementation of existing state 
commitments to rule of law, human rights and equality (Potter, 2011; Potter and Woodman, 
2012). Not all critics are as moderate, but even those calling for an end to one-party rule 
generally frame their endeavour with reference to normative principles already widely 
accepted in China, rather than making claims for all-out Westernisation, for example. 
 
Oppositional critics whose complaints or claims have been determined by local or national 
authorities to be outside the bounds of acceptable speech can find themselves entirely 
excluded from all segmented publics. The idea that variably situated people have differential 
rights of expression – or can be deprived of their right to speak altogether – is a key principle 
in the Chinese legal order. This logic is expressed most clearly in the concept of “deprivation 
of political rights”,8 which is a required addition to any conviction under provisions of the 
Criminal Law on endangering national security,9 and may be applied to people convicted of 
other specified serious offences. The deprivation of political rights – and thus of any right to 
speak or be heard – is most identified with those found to be “enemies” of national security. 
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Such restrictions rest on what might be termed “applied class struggle”,10 a new variant of the 
old logic expressed in Mao Zedong’s famous classification of disputes as being either among 
“the people” or between “the people” and “enemies” (Mao, 1989). While this formulation is 
now more commonly evoked as a rationale for ensuring that “internal contradictions” are 
promptly addressed so as to forestall unrest, it still implies that there are those outside the 
pale who cannot be dealt with except through suppression. Those in the category of enemies 
are generally identified with “hostile foreign forces”, and such a connection is inherent in the 
Chinese legal concept of crimes against national security (Fu and Cullen, 1996).  
 
The response of the authorities to such persons is uncompromising: they attempt to eliminate 
them entirely from public view, shutting off their means of communication with any domestic 
public. Key word filtering ensures that even their names disappear from any domestic public 
sphere. No news about such “banned people” can appear in the domestic media. For example, 
the only reporting permitted of the high-profile trial of Liu Xiaobo was a very short Xinhua 
notice, and other media were forbidden from adding to the report (Cui, 2012).  
 
Banned people can only express themselves through oppositional publics, to which the state 
actively seeks to block access, both through Internet firewalls and filters and through 
preventing gatherings involving banned people. These oppositional publics are thus 
segmented out of the domestic public sphere. Oppositional publics are restricted either to 
face-to-face communication, or to spheres outside the control of the Chinese state, most 
notably in the transnational Chinese language Internet. In the context of overwhelming state 
control, a kitchen table or a private apartment can become part of the public sphere when it is 
used as such (Goldfarb, 2006). Publishing in transnational media may provide an outlet for 
oppositional critics, but it can also confirm a person’s status as an “enemy”. For example, the 
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main items of “evidence” in the case against Liu Xiaobo were six articles he wrote and 
published online and the Charter. For each of the pieces of writing listed in the court’s 
verdict, the fact that it was published on a website outside the PRC was noted, demonstrating 
a linkage to “hostile foreign forces” that was central to proving the prosecution’s case that 
Liu engaged in “subversion of state power”.11 This type of argumentation is common to such 
cases. 
 
Ironically, reinforcing segmentation by turning complainants and dissidents into non-persons 
cuts them off from elites. Although this means that most have few direct channels to 
authorities through which to pursue claims or exert influence, it also limits the mechanisms 
elites can use to exert influence over them. In less authoritarian polities, strong segmentation 
gives elites limited leverage over excluded groups, leaving repression as the only strategy to 
prevent protests and other oppositional activities by these groups (Crossley, 2002). This 
tendency is also apparent in China, where brutal tactics including disappearances and torture 
are used against people outside the bounds of persuasion. In this instance, however, state 
penetration down to the most local level generally provides ample resources for efforts to 
impose certain kinds of social and economic sanctions against petitioners and other 
recalcitrant complainants or critics (Deng and O’Brien, 2013; Chinese Human Rights 
Defenders, 2011). 
 
At least at the elite level, such disconnection should not be assumed, however. As Feng 
Chongyi has shown, the links of the loose-knit liberal opposition to current and former 
officials and intellectuals within the system are extensive (Feng, 2008). In practice, many 
oppositional critics navigate between segmented publics in which they still find ways to 
express themselves and the transnational oppositional sphere. An example is apparent in the 
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use of micro-blogging. While services such as Sina’s Weibo are widely used by people 
advancing agendas critical of local and central governments, messages they cannot post on 
these domestic fora may be circulated on Twitter, which is outside the realm of Chinese 
government censorship. Twitter has been used, for example, to organise protest actions or 
circulate information that would be blocked by filtering technology. 
 
Some Rules of the Game 
 
Even the exercise of the constitutional “right to complain” is conditional on the 
appropriateness of the venue in which the complaint is made. The same words spoken in 
different venues can have very different consequences. The status of the speaker also matters: 
an academic may raise points in a closed-door conference that might immediately get a 
member of an association into trouble. The unwritten rules of segmented publics are 
supported by cultural norms such as the prohibition on “airing the family’s dirt outside” (家
丑往外扬 jiachou wang wai yang) and the idea of “giving face”. Both of these norms make 
public criticism difficult, thus reinforcing segmentation. 
 
The rules operating across the four types of segmented publics outlined above share certain 
similarities, but differences are also apparent. For the elite and grassroots publics, rules are 
more formalised, as both types relate to particular institutions with formal membership 
criteria and associated venues in which speech is permissible. In the case of the residents and 
villager committees, political rights are formalised in the Constitution and in law.  
 
The bounded nature of privileged segmented publics is reinforced by cultural norms 
distinguishing elites from “the masses”. Elitist conceptions of tutelage over “the masses” 
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legitimise debate within elite institutions based on the status of their members. For example, 
some Chinese scholars have argued that deliberative democracy can develop among 
intellectuals first in a closed “public sphere”, and then gradually be expanded (Davies, 2007). 
This is related to the broader trend towards specialisation in modernity, which Habermas 
noted as a force that mitigates against a unified public arena or even a coherent conception of 
the “public good” (Crossley and Roberts, 2004).  
 
By contrast, the rules governing associational publics and the boundaries of tolerance for the 
speech of oppositional critics are largely unwritten, and even intentionally ambiguous. In the 
area of regulation of NGOs, for example, the intentional ambiguity of a system of unwritten 
rules has been a consistent strategy of both central and local governments in China, allowing 
them flexibility to decide what is “harmful” to social stability and national security in specific 
cases (Deng, 2010). The relative lack of clear rules means that associational and oppositional 
publics in particular are dynamic spaces. For example, events often present moments of 
opportunity to bring certain viewpoints to a wider public, with the 2008 Wenchuan 
Earthquake being a key example.  
 
In all of the forms of segmented publics discussed here, when disputes arise, boundaries of 
appropriate expression become politicised, and the right of a person or group to raise a 
complaint or speak on a certain issue may be challenged (Zhu and Ho, 2008). People making 
contentious claims try to forestall such politicisation by articulating the specific laws and 
policies that make their grievance a legitimate matter for that particular public arena (O’Brien 
and Li, 2006). Such legitimating tactics were evident in the public meeting on women in 
Indonesia mentioned above, where the Beijing Platform for Action agreed at the Fourth 
World Conference on Women was used to justify expressing concern (Milwertz and Bu, 
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2009, pp. 227–44). Even within expert publics, controversial claims generally need to be 
framed in a way that demonstrates how they are supported by hegemonic norms (see, for 
example, Kellogg, 2009; Keech-Marx, 2008). 
 
The dynamic and contested nature of these divisions is obscured by formulations that 
distinguish between strategies of working “inside” and “outside” the state system, sometimes 
contrasted as “engagement” versus “confrontation”.12 In fact, the boundaries are blurred and 
constantly shifting, and the distinctions above are better thought of as situated along a series 
of spectrums, with multiple versions of the binary of “inside” and “outside” defining the 
scope of overlapping segmented publics. For the expert and grassroots publics, the rules may 
be formalised, yet such politicisation still occurs when contentious claims or positions are 
advanced.  
 
Furthermore, the state and the Party cannot be seen as monolithic, and those who advance 
controversial issues or make public previously unknown matters often seek to take advantage 
of divisions of opinion and interest within them to press their cause. In the case of the public 
meeting on the plight of women in Indonesia, expanding public space for debate over a range 
of concerns including women’s rights was an explicit aim of holding the meeting (Milwertz 
and Bu, 2009). The actions of those on the edges, those who make “boundary-spanning 
claims”, as O’Brien and Li (2006) describe them, can result in sanctions or may serve to 
enlarge the scope of debate. Those who dismiss “confrontational” strategies as being 
counterproductive ignore the fact that the boundaries are blurred, and often people do not 
know where the “forbidden zones” begin and end. What was acceptable today in one place 
may not be tomorrow in another (Stern and O’Brien, 2012).     
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When publics operate through media such as the Internet, academic publications or limited 
circulation newsletters, another layer of complication arises. Each medium operates under 
different levels of constraint (Yang and Calhoun, 2007). Adding a further level of 
complexity, individuals may move between segmented publics and simultaneously operate 
within different ones. The presence of certain individuals who are Party members or have 
strong official connections may paradoxically enable debate within certain publics, as their 
presence can be deemed to inoculate these spaces against “going too far”. In my Tianjin field 
sites, the Party members were the most outspoken critics of the failings of their institutions 
and the authorities more generally. At the same time, if the boundaries of acceptable speech 
shift or activities of a certain segmented public are labelled as problematic, these same people 
may face greater risk than others.  
 
The system of constraints (and censorship more generally) is highly personalised. This 
applies both to those exercising control, and those being controlled.  In the first of these 
areas, leaders are responsible for exercising control over the people within their jurisdiction 
or in their unit, but are also crucial to the development of institutional cultures within certain 
spaces that are favourable to more open debate, as was evident in the resident and villager 
committees. This is also apparent in the variation between the institutional cultures of 
universities and think tanks, and even among departments within them. Some leaders may 
allow a lot of debate, and indeed may use their institution to pursue aims at variance with 
those set by the Party leadership, while others may impose much more conservative norms. 
This flexibility has been increased by decentralisation and administrative reforms (Ding, 
1994). As Ho has argued in relation to environmental organisations, their embeddedness 
within formal institutional spaces and networks can be enabling as well as constraining (Ho, 
2007; Ho and Edmonds, 2008). 
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By contrast, the “responsibility systems” that enable debate in this way can also lead to 
suppression of complaints and discussion in other kinds of environments (Minzner, 2009; 
Minzner, 2006), with the imprisonment of repeat petitioners in psychiatric hospitals being an 
extreme example.13 By punishing officials “responsible” for contentious speech and claims 
that exceed the bounds of the designated segmented public(s) within their jurisdiction, central 
government rules for evaluating cadres encourage such repression of complainants (Chinese 
Human Rights Defenders, 2008). 
 
Segmented publics can also be analysed in terms of individuals; they clearly accord members 
and non-members differing rights to speak. Yet individuals may have membership in several 
different segmented publics. Many activists move between different spheres, adjusting to 
their variable rules regulating speech and action as they go. For intellectuals, the “pluralised 
publics” in which they engage mean complex considerations of what can be said where 
(Cheek, 2007). Relative expertise is a key dimension for entitlement within elite publics, but 
age is another important factor, giving retired democrats within the CCP relative latitude to 
make comments critical of government policy and actions, for example. These officials have 
continued to publish articles that go against the current consensus in advocating democratic 
reform, “whereas less privileged authors have been banned from publishing on much less 
sensitive topics” (Feng, 2008, p. 683). Age also gives members in associational and 
grassroots publics more latitude to raise critical concerns. Such “differential rights” operate 
along a spectrum of entitlements (Potter and Woodman, 2012). While the CCP democrats 
represent one extreme, the other is illuminated by the outside boundaries of differential rights 
as described above, when people become non-persons in domestic segmented publics and can 
only have a voice in oppositional publics.    
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The boundaries between “people” and “enemies”, between members and non-members of 
segmented publics, can also be dynamic, contextual and contested. They are also historical 
and cumulative. Liu Xiaobo’s record as a former political prisoner and his identification with 
the events of 1989 are important in understanding why he received such a severe sentence, in 
contrast to other Charter ’08 drafters.14 These distinctions apply well beyond high-profile 
cases such as Liu’s. The designation of “enemies” can occur at any level of the system. 
Applying political labels to people is a practice that continues as a key tactic in daily 
contentious politics, with the aim of discrediting the claims of complainants (Zhu and Ho, 
2008). Those whose grievances threaten the power of local officials can thus find themselves 
deprived of all rights to raise their concerns, regardless of how mundane. This is evident in 
the treatment of petitioners who repeatedly appeal outside their place of hukou registration, 
where such complaints would be permissible (Chinese Human Rights Defenders, 2008), and 
was evident among long-term petitioners in my field sites. 
 
The scope of expression allowed in various segmented publics and the relative degree of 
differential rights are temporally and spatially dynamic. For example, controls over 
petitioning are tightened significantly in the run-up to the annual “two meetings” of the 
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and the National People’s Congress, and 
there are routine clampdowns around the anniversary of the June Fourth Tiananmen Massacre. 
Academic conferences on a sensitive topic can be held at some times, and in some places, and 
not in others. Béja (2009) suggests that one factor in the severity of Liu’s punishment was the 
Chinese leadership’s fear that the release of Charter ’08 on the eve of the significant year of 
2009 (marking the twentieth anniversary of June Fourth and the sixtieth of the founding of 
the PRC) could have a similarly catalysing effect on the public to open letters calling for 
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democratisation issued in late 1988 and early 1989. Such logics do not only apply to national-
level events; local politics also generate varying climates for expression at different moments. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The concept of “segmented publics” has been deployed in this paper as an analytical tool to 
elucidate patterns underlying apparently inconsistent regulation of public expression in China 
today. It captures institutional-level elements relating to the location of expression and also 
the way status contributes to individuals’ opportunities to bring their concerns into public 
spaces. Segmentation, it shows, is both a national and local state strategy for containing 
contention and limiting public debate within certain constrained spheres, but also a set of 
habits and cultural norms that are reinforced, in particular, by distinctions between what is 
acceptable for members of the elite and for “the masses”. It focuses in particular on 
contestation over the boundaries of legitimate public concern. 
 
Previous schemes to map publics have focused largely on intellectuals and elites (Gu, 1993–
94; Gu, 1998), but this model attempts to capture a broader range of possible publics, 
including at the grassroots. The concept of segmented publics highlights how similar sets of 
constraints operate across the division between elite and mass, despite the cultural 
distinctions noted above. This is not to say that these constraints have equal effects: the 
topography of segmented publics is distinctly uneven, and a more systematic mapping of 
levels of access to different spheres than has been possible in this article would highlight 
distinctive inequalities, particularly along class lines. Yang (2010) provides a notable 
example in showing how the environmental concerns that are most life-threatening to China’s 
rural population get the least coverage in the mainstream media. Whereas workers and 
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women have entry to the polity through mass organisations – despite the often-described 
limitations of these – there is still no such organisation representing farmers. In contemporary 
China, such inequalities are built into many of the institutional forms that frame segmented 
public spheres, and are thus a matter of state policy and cultural norms. The permitted scope 
and potential impact of discussion in elite segmented publics is generally much broader than 
that in grassroots publics which are limited to local affairs; but the face-to-face interactions of 
grassroots publics can provide more fertile ground for concerted collective action on matters 
impacting people’s daily lives. Even though recent research suggests that forestalling 
collective action is among the principal motives for censorship of social media (King, Pan 
and Roberts, 2013), their institutional form legitimates a certain degree of collective 
mobilisation within grassroots and associational segmented publics. What most concerns the 
authorities, it seems, is efforts that seek to take political action and its associated speech 
beyond these bounds. 
 
The institutions and practices of segmented publics are increasingly challenged, both by 
efforts of oppositional critics and aggrieved citizens to bring their concerns into the public 
arena, and by social, economic and technological developments, including population 
mobility and the spread of the Internet, mobile phones and social media. “Pluralisation” is 
apparent beyond expert and intellectual publics (Cheek, 2007), as people increasingly cross 
administrative boundaries in a variety of ways. As I have shown, the spaces of segmented 
publics are dynamic and contested. Issues are made public through the active efforts of a host 
of differently situated actors seeking to advance their concerns, grievances and convictions 
(Yang, 2010). Complicating this picture, speech framed in socially conformist terms may 
actually be challenging those norms, as in “rightful resistance” (O’Brien and Li, 2006). The 
informal political talk that circulates within certain segmented publics – not only of the 
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oppositional kind – can generate oppositional framings that may emerge into a wider space 
when conditions are ripe.  
 
Such challenges are particularly apparent in types of segmented publics where rules are less 
clear – namely, associational and oppositional publics. This raises a number of questions for 
further research. How do the networks that criss-cross segmented publics and link them to 
each other and to the formal state apparatus contribute to the movement of what becomes 
public? What are the boundaries and limits and how are they set? Elaborating on this latter 
point has been a central aim of this article, thus contributing to a new focus on boundaries in 
Chinese politics more generally (Stern and O’Brien, 2012). I have also illuminated a set of 
regularities that are underpinned largely by unwritten rules. As Deng writes, “[T]o understand 
China’s political environment, it is not sufficient to have an understanding of the written or 
publicised laws and regulations. A full understanding requires an in-depth exploration of the 
unwritten or unpublicised hidden rules in China’s government administration system” (Deng, 
2010, p. 200). A related dimension highlighted by this article is the importance of intentional 
ambiguity as a strategic resource for both officials and their critics. 
 
As spaces for critical speech, segmented publics are contingent on rapidly changing official 
tolerance. This varies greatly across local, regional and national scales, as well as fluctuating 
depending on time, but limits are contextual and never clear. Micro-politics within certain 
defined fields of action require constant policing of self and others, often through what Stern 
and Hassid term “control parables”, “didactic stories about transgression [that] help the 
politically inclined map the gray zone between (relatively) safe and unacceptably risky 
choices” (Stern and Hassid, 2012, p. 1230). Spaces contract as well as expand; in the past two 
years, the climate for engaging in political questions through means of law has steadily 
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worsened, with activist lawyers facing increasingly severe repression, for example (Fu, 
2012). Yet emergent events set the agenda of what comes into view, whether in the mass 
media or in narrower publics. In the routine politics of everyday life, the boundaries of 
segmented publics are constantly under challenge.  
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Notes 
1 The extent of restriction of information authorised by secrecy laws and regulations in China has 
been widely noted (Human Rights in China, 2007). 
2 Peter Foster, ‘Leading Chinese dissident claims freedom of speech worse than before Olympics’. 
Daily Telegraph, 27 April 2009. Available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/5230707/Leading-Chinese-dissident-
claims-freedom-of-speech-worse-than-before-Olympics.html, accessed 13 April 2012. 
3 PRC Constitution, 1982, Art.s 41 and 111; Organic Law on Villager Committees, 1998, Art. 2; 
Organic Law on Urban Resident Committees, 1989, Art. 3. 
4 This section is based on 2008–09 field work in Tianjin (Woodman, 2011b). The two resident 
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